A Management Decision Overrides a Recommendation Not to Launch
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The major activity that day focused upon the predicted 18
degrees Fahrenheit overnight temperature and meeting with
engineering management to persuade them not to launch. The day
concluded with the hurried preparation of fourteen viewgraphs
which detailed our concerns about launching at such a low
temperature. The teleconference with Kennedy Space Center (KSC)
and MSFC started with a history of O-ring damage in field
joints. Data was presented showing a major concern with seal
resiliency and the change to the sealing timing function and
the criticality of this on the ability to seal. I was asked
several times during my portion of the presentation to quantify
my concerns, but I said I could not since the only data I had
was what I had presented and that I had been trying to get more
data since last October. At this comment, the general manager
of Morton Thiokol gave me a scolding look as if to say, "Why
are you telling that to them?" The presentation ended with the
recommendation not to launch below 53 degrees. This was not
well received by NASA. The Vice President of Space Booster
Programs, Joe Kilminster, was then asked by NASA for his launch
decision. He said he did not recommend launching, based upon
the engineering position just presented. Then Larry Mulloy of
NASA (who was at KSC) asked George Hardy of NASA (who was at
MSFC) for his launch decision. George responded that he was
appalled at Thiokol's recommendation but said he would not
launch over the contractor's objection. Then Larry Mulloy spent
some time giving his interpretation of the data with his
conclusion that the data presented was inconclusive.
Just as he finished his conclusion, Joe Kilminster asked for
a five minute off-line caucus to re-evaluate the data, and as
soon as the mute button was pushed our general manager, Jerry
Mason, said in a soft voice, "We have to make a management
decision." I became furious when I heard this because I knew
that an attempt would be made by management to reverse our
recommendation not to launch.
Some discussion had started between the managers when Arnie
Thompson moved from his position down the table to a position
in front of the managers and once again tried to explain our
position by sketching the joint and discussing the problem with
the seals at low temperature. Arnie stopped when he saw the
unfriendly look in Mason's eyes and also realized that no one
was listening to him. I then grabbed the photographic evidence
showing the hot gas blow-by and placed it on the table and,
somewhat angered, admonished them to look and not ignore what
the photos were telling us, namely, that low temperature indeed
caused more hot gas blow-by in the joints. I too received the
same cold stares as Arnie with looks as if to say, "Go away and
don't bother us with the facts." At that moment I felt totally
helpless and felt that further argument was fruitless, so I,
too, stopped pressing my case.
What followed made me both sad and angry. The managers who
were struggling to make a pro-launch list of supporting data
actually supported a decision not to launch. During the closed
managers' discussion, Jerry Mason asked in a low voice if he
was the only one who wanted to fly. The discussion continued,
then Mason turned to Bob Lund, the vice-president of
engineering, and told him to take off his engineering hat and
put on his management hat. The decision to launch resulted from
the yes vote of only the four senior executives since the rest
of us were excluded from both the final decision and the vote
poll. The telecon resumed, and Joe Kilminster read the launch
support rationale from a handwritten list and recommended that
the launch proceed. NASA promptly accepted the recommendation
to launch without any probing discussion and asked Joe to send
a signed copy of the chart.
The change in decision so upset me that I do not remember
Stanley Reinhartz of NASA asking if anyone had anything else to
say over the telecon. The telecon was then disconnected so I
immediately left the room feeling badly defeated.
Discussion Questions
What is the situation that Boisjoly faces now? He has
presented his case. NASA has acted in a way that was
unprecedented in Boisjoly's experience. They have put the
burden of proof on those who belived it was risky to fly rather
than on those who felt it was safe to fly. Fearing that NASA
will not continue to make Morton Thiokol the sole contractor
for the Solid Rocket Booster program if they insist on holding
back the Challenger flight, management has
reversed the decision made by engineering. Boisjoly doesn't
have the hard data that he has been requesting since last
summer and which is now needed to prove that low temperature is
a major contributor in hot gas blow-by, and his job appears to
be at stake. He has had over a year to work on the joint
problem and in that time ten shuttle missions have flown
successfully. Is there anything else that can be done at this
point?