Lab-Scam: How Science Goes Bad
Author(s):
Daniel S. Greenberg
In this article, Greenberg describes how characteristics of the scientific community make allegations of misconduct hard to make. Many members of the scientific community argue that cases of scientific misconduct are easily detected by the current self-checking system. They further argue that such cases reflect mentally disturbed scientists and are very rare. Greenberg points out that such cases, however rare, are not handled well by the scientific community. Greenberg describes two cases in which whistleblowers had a hard time getting people to take their allegations seriously. In the David Baltimore case, for example, the three member investigating team appointed by the NIH contained two members who had academic ties with the accused. When people voiced concern about conflict of interest, the NIH finally removed them from the team, even though a spokesperson for the NIH (Mary L. Miers) said that they would have been objective. At the time of this article, and 16 months after the initial allegations were made, a new investigating team had not been reconvened. In another case, Dr. Sprague alleged that Dr. Breuning had fabricated and falsified data in his Coldwater Studies. Dr. Breuning resigned from the University of Pittsburgh and the University dropped the matter. Concerned that Breuning's data was serving as the basis of policy in many sectors, Sprague did not give up. It was not until 31/2 years after his initial complaint that the NIMH finally released a statement and ordered the University to repay funds given to support Dr. Breuning's research. for Greenberg, these cases illustrate that the atmosphere is not right for potential whistleblowers to feel confident in coming forward with allegations. Furthermore, it seems that some whistleblowers are at risk of losing their own jobs.
Greenberg also discusses some of the effects and causes of scientific misconduct. Greenberg highlights the case of Dr. Robert Slutsky, who fabricated data on cardiac research, to show the effects on co-authors who were put on papers out of respect rather than because of contribution to the project or knowledge of its validity. Greenberg highlights the case of Dr. John Darsee, who was accused o fabricating and falsifying data, to discuss some possible causes for misconduct; the admiration by the scientific community for quantity rather than quality of research, the multiple responsibilities of lab leaders, and the lack of competent verification of others' work. An investigation of Darsee lead by Ross, the dean of John's Hopkins Medical School, found Darsee guilty of the accusations but absolved the senior faculty Braunwald and Kloner. A subsequent investigation by the NIH blamed Braunwald and Kloner for creating a lab atmosphere that emphasized productivity and for having multiple responsibilities that precluded them from properly supervising work done in their lab.
The Darsee case prompted two NIH researchers, Ned Feder and Walter Stewart, to examine several of Darsee's papers for blatant errors that any competent researcher who took the time to verify the work should have found. They concluded that there were several such errors. For example, in one paper Darsee wrote about a 17 year old patient who has four children with ages ranging from 4 to 8 years. Feder and Stewart concluded that the co-authors did not properly verify the content of the papers. Feder and Stewart wrote a paper about their findings but could not get it published; journals cited fear of libel suits as a justification. These researchers, leaders in the quest for purity of scientific literature, now receive more complaints about scientific misconduct than the official NIH office. In a current case, O'Toole alleges that she was barred from furthering her scientific career when she voiced suspicion about the accuracy of data in a paper co-authored by Dr. Baltimore.
Abstract by Elysa R. Koppelman, Ph.D.