Joseph Ellin's Commentary on "Shortage of Components"
I
Ruskin Manufacturing has made a commitment which it
evidently cannot meet. A component is in short supply and
Ruskin cannot met its deadline to deliver completed machines to
Parker Products by the 10th of the month. The problem falls
into the lap of Tim Vinson, head of quality control. None of
the options he thinks of seem particularly appealing. No
explanation is given of why the component is in short supply,
or why Tim doesn't find this out until the 8th, or whether he
could or should have done something to assure that, short
supply or not, his share of the components would arrive on
time, except that he is said to "feel responsible" for not
seeing the problem earlier. It is possible that he or someone
has been negligent somewhere along the line; but it seems
likely that the supplier is at fault for failing to deliver the
components, which suggests that Ruskin has a lawsuit against
the supplier and thus a means of shifting any penalty it
suffers for failing to make timely delivery to Parker.
The case does not state exactly what is at stake for either
Ruskin or Parker if Ruskin fails to deliver as scheduled. If
there is only a money loss for both, Ruskin may be off the hook
by shifting this to the supplier. This needs to be determined
before any drastic action is taken by anyone. So if Tim doesn't
know, he ought to find out first thing. First he ought to
consult with the person in the company who's familiar with
Parker and with Ruskin's contracts with both Parker and the
supplier. This might be Arnold Peterson, or it might be someone
else. If Tim doesn't have access to that person (how big a
company is Ruskin, anyway?), he might find out who does and
take it from there. The first requirement in solving a problem
is to identify just what the problem is. As quality control
officer, Tim would not seem to know enough to be able to reach
a good solution on his own, unless he's very lucky!
Another option would be for Tim to call Parker and explain
how things stand, and see what they say. Evidently he does not
consider doing this, but the case does not explain why he
doesn't. Perhaps Tim is not authorized to consult with Ruskin's
customers. Or perhaps he thinks that's not his job. In that
case, he should find out who is, because it is possible that
one of the options Tim is considering, either (1) or (2), might
satisfy Parker, who might not be so concerned with impurities,
or with getting new components (option 2) when old components
would meet minimal standards. Under this condition there is the
possibility that Parker might want to renegotiate the contract
or invoke a penalty, if the contract specifies such. Presumably
Tim isn't the person in Ruskin who would know about this.
Another possibility is that Parker might simply prefer to
wait until the specified components arrive. Or perhaps delivery
with old components can be made now, and the new components
installed at the site when they arrive. The problem is Parker's
as much as Ruskin's, since they will either get their machines
late, or receive machines which are not quite what they
contracted for; and the decision between these choices should
be up to them. Parker undoubtedly will not be happy with the
news that the components haven't arrived, but they foreseeably
will be more unhappy if they receive machines which aren't what
they ordered.
The point is that Tim considers two options which would
circumvent Parker and in effect deceive it about what it's
getting. This is not only dishonest but holds out all sorts of
promises of future trouble. Better to admit your failure, even
if you're not really at fault--the lawyers can argue over this
later--than try to cover it up. But assume that Tim knows,
suspects, or discovers that Ruskin would have big problems if
it fails to deliver the precisely specified machines at the
time guaranteed. So he is reluctant to contact Parker without
first trying to improvise something. His obvious next step is
to consult with the design engineer, to assure himself that
there is no remedy other than (1) and (2). Not being a design
engineer himself, evidently, he needs to search for a third
solution before acting. To act on his own without enlisting
engineering help seems reckless.
II
Tim does the responsible thing and consults with the chief
engineer, who ducks the problem and passes the buck back to
Tim. Chuck should lose a few points for surly
non-cooperativeness. However he seems to have confirmed that
there is no third engineering option, which is what Tim wanted
to find out. There is still the option of contacting Parker.
Tim can either take action himself or inform the next level up,
which is Vice President Arnold Peterson. Perhaps Arnold will
not be happy to have this brought to his attention; evidently
there is some reason to suspect that officers at Ruskin company
prefer not to know about problems in their company.
But any decision Tim makes commits the company to a line of
action which is potentially damaging, might involve a law suit,
loss of customer confidence, etc. So he has to decide whether
he wants to take this responsibility himself, or whether it
properly belongs at a higher level. Tim ought to realize that
he does not know enough about what is really at stake for him
to make the decision himself whether or not to contact Parker.
If in fact Ruskin is protected in its contract with its
supplier, Arnold might know this or be able to find out. An
assessment of the risk needs to be made by someone in a better
position than Tim. So however uncomfortable he feels, Tim
really has no choice but to consult with someone else at
Ruskin, and this seems to be Arnold.
III (Version 1)
Tim calls Arnold. (a) Arnold's stupid and irresponsible
reply gives Tim the green light to do whatever he wants,
although "just meet the deadline" presumably means he is not to
call Parker. Arnold doesn't tell Tim just what is at stake for
Ruskin if the deadline is not met, but his reply certainly
suggests that the stakes are higher than Ruskin wants to risk.
Thus Tim is effectively excluded from calling Parker. Arnold
has in effect committed Ruskin to a conspiracy to deceive
Parker and violate its contract. Does Tim want to go along with
this and choose one of the 'redesign' options, or does he want
to go around Arnold and try and find someone with more sense?
The uncooperativeness of both Chuck and Arnold makes it seem as
if Ruskin might be a company in which no one has any sense!
(Tim might be part of this, since he never considered talking
to Parker in the first place). In that case, Tim had best go
along with the bosses, unless he is interested in looking for a
job elsewhere.
Since option (2) involves least risk to Parker, if Tim isn't
interested in challenging Arnold, he should opt for this. In
effect, Arnold has ordered him to do so. However Tim cannot
feel he is off the hook because of the vague way in which
Arnold put his instructions. Tim could still do the right thing
and contact Parker himself; he would not be countermanding a
clear and direct order because Arnold only told him to 'take
care' of the problem without consulting management.
Version (b). In this scenario, Arnold is much more
forthcoming and gives Tim a clear order, and explains to him
the reason for it. Tim now knows there is a lot at stake.
Arnold accepts responsibility for faking the delivery to
Parker. So from one point of view, Tim is definitely off the
hook. He has made his report to management and been told to go
ahead and fill the order despite not having the correct
components. Arnold says he is unhappy with what they have to
do, but he evidently doesn't see an alternative that would
protect the company. The machines to be delivered, under option
(2), meet minimum standards and will function well. So maybe
it's reasonable to hope that Parker's customers will not lose
out. If no great issues of safety or reliability are involved,
Tim might very well conclude that he is not obliged to go
beyond his position in the company and countermand direct
orders, especially when Ruskin seems to have a lot at stake in
making the delivery on schedule.
But Arnold's reason raises some very interesting ethical
points. Should Ruskin as a company and Tim individually go
along with Parker? In Arnold's opinion (how he knows this, he
doesn't say), Parker is playing a very cute game with its own
customers. They are willing to pass along inferior machines
provided the customers don't know and can't blame them, Parker,
if they do find out. Parker would seem to be guilty of culpable
ignorance: deliberately overlooking a possible problem in order
to pretend that you aren't responsible for it. This is
unethical on Parker's part; but does Ruskin have an obligation
to force Parker to act ethically by telling them about the
problem, even if they don't want to know about it? I think it
depends on just how serious a problem it is.
If Parker's customers were to have serious problems with the
inferior machines, then Ruskin would be culpable for not
informing Parker so that Parker could inform its customers. In
this case, the substitutes meet minimal safety standards, and
the fact that the substitution is probably going to be
undetected indicates that the substitute machines function just
as well as the ordered ones. The customers are harmed only by
being deceived, and not in any other way. So assuming Arnold is
correct in implying that relations between Ruskin and Parker
would be soured if Ruskin informed Parker of the problem, Tim
and Ruskin are probably justified in not doing so. It might
even be argued that they are rather self-sacrificing in this
course, since they would be protecting Parker by assuming all
liability should Parker's customers find out about the switch
and complain. One hopes that Parker appreciates this nobility
on Ruskin's part.
Version (c). In this version, Arnold is out of town and
'cannot be reached.' Has Arnold left the planet? If so, who's
doing his job while he's out in space? Since it's important
that Tim consult with someone, Tim has the duty to find Arnold
or someone else and get the advice and information he
needs.
III (Version 2)
sTim does not call Arnold, because he thinks Arnold does not
want to be bothered. Not calling Arnold is a mistake for the
reasons given above, and Tim should have to expect to answer to
Arnold for it. Why does no one in Ruskin Manufacturing want to
accept responsibility for tough decisions? Tim might point out
to Arnold the self-defeating corporate culture of 'don't bother
the boss.' Since Arnold is a VP he presumably contributes to
this. So he can't back-track now and complain that Tim didn't
bring him this problem. However Tim might not find it expedient
to say this. So he has little choice but to defend himself as
best he can: that the components didn't arrive and he did the
best he could. That the chief engineer informed him that there
was no option anyway. That he considered informing Parker but
didn't consider it wise to do so. That it is not too late to
tell Parker now, if that's what Arnold wants, and offer to
install the new components as soon as they arrive.
IV
The chickens come home to roost as Tim and Ruskin's luck
turns bad. Tim has substituted the old components but the
machines don't function as well as they are supposed to and
Parker has discovered the substitution. Honesty might have
proved the better policy. At the meeting to explain things to
Parker, he has to put the best face on it: the components
didn't come so he substituted something which ought to have
worked just as well. Ruskin naturally will pay for damage, lost
production, or whatever the loss to Parker has been. He had
better ask to talk first to Arnold to make sure they have their
signals together before seeing the Parker person.
V
Would it follow that Tim had acted appropriately if Parker
never found out? No, it doesn't follow that Tim acted
appropriately. It doesn't follow that he didn't either. Nothing
follows from the fact that a questionable act is not
discovered. Whether or not he acted properly follows from
what's been said above.
Summary: evidently Ruskin's best course would have been to
contact Parker and so Tim's course was to try to get an officer
of Ruskin to authorize this. However possibly not contacting
Parker could be excused if the stakes for Ruskin are
sufficiently high and if the damage to Parker is sufficiently
trivial. But Ruskin has to be prepared to pay the penalty for
this course of action, should Parker find out about it.
Cite this page:
"Joseph Ellin's Commentary on "Shortage of Components""
Online Ethics Center for Engineering
8/17/2006
National Academy of Engineering
Accessed: Tuesday, May 22, 2012
<www.onlineethics.org/Resources/Cases/Shortage/ShortageEllin.aspx>