Kenneth L. Carper's Commentary on "Dissent about Nuclear Safety"
Alison Turner is experiencing a moral crisis partly because
of an unhealthy group leadership situation. In order for group
problem solving to be successful, a style of discussion
leadership must be developed to maximize the group's assets and
minimize its liabilities (Ritchie and Thompson 1980).
The Plant Nuclear Safety Review Committee includes more than
one individual because a group has access to more knowledge and
experience than an individual has. Also, a group can generate
more alternatives to solving a problem, and can explore a
problem from a greater number of perspectives than an
individual can. Such assets are particularly valuable when the
group is charged with safety oversight responsibilities for
critical facilities. These aspects of group problem solving can
only be realized, however, when the group leader understands
and facilitates effective group dynamics. Each individual must
be encouraged to voice concerns, including contingencies that
have not been considered by other group members. Each
individual must feel valued by the group. This is the goal of
leadership ethics (Maier 1980).
Rich Robinson, chair of the committee, is not exercising
effective leadership. He is dominating the discussion, and with
the help of two other strong personalities, Brad Louks and Joe
Carpello, he is quickly leading the group toward a preconceived
decision. Alison Turner, along with others, is hesitant to
accept this decision, but no one speaks. Alison is especially
uncomfortable because she is the least senior member present at
the meeting.
Group decisions, especially unanimous group decisions, are
generally given more weight than decisions made by individuals.
However, this case illustrates that group decisions may, in
fact, represent the viewpoint of a single member of the group
or the judgment of a minority of dominant individuals.
Unless all individuals in the group are comfortable in
contributing to a consensus, the value of the group is
questionable. The decisions may as well be made by an
individual, or by a computer using expert systems technology.
People, not computers, have been trusted with the oversight
assignment in this case, and the reason is that
experience-based judgments are needed.
The experience brought to a problem by senior members of a
group is valuable. However, sometimes seniority works to
disadvantage. The less-senior members may feel uncomfortable
challenging their superiors. But the less-senior members are
often able to bring fresh insights and new experiences to the
problem. Senior members may be inclined toward misguided
loyalties and may become complacent and defensive. These
attributes can be seen in some of the comments by Brad Louks
and Joe Carpello: "...we've always been leaders in safety,"
and, "Our track record is excellent..." When contingencies are
being ignored, these attitudes need to be challenged. The
less-senior members of the group can be very effective in
energizing a complacent group if the leadership is healthy.
This committee has a precedence of always arriving at a
unanimous decision. The account given here causes one to
question the wisdom of honoring such a tradition. If a
unanimous decision represents a consensus agreed to willingly
by all members of the group, then the unanimity may be an
indication of the quality of the decision. However, in this
case, it appears that a unanimous decision may be the result of
social pressure. Social pressure within a group can stifle
disagreement. Uncomfortable parties remain silent and conform
to the wishes of dominant individuals (Maier 1980).
Alison and at least one other member, Mark Reynolds, are not
comfortable with the direction the group is taking. Public
welfare may be at stake, and one hopes that these individuals
will decide to place the public interest above their own
personal comfort. This is the hallmark of professionalism.
Sometimes things do go wrong in spite of low probability, and
concern for this contingency is what separates the true
professional from the "uninvolved" technician. The engineering
Code of Ethics requires members of the profession to "...hold
paramount the health, safety and welfare of the public" (Pletta
1987, Rubin and Banick 1987).
Since Alison still has reservations, she should not vote to
approve the Justification for Continued Operation. The
committee will be forced to either address her concerns, or to
depart from the precedence of unanimity. It should be noted
that there is some merit to abandoning the practice of forced
unanimity. Dissenting viewpoints based on rational arguments
are useful, especially when something goes wrong. The
dissenting comments assist in the re-evaluation of decision
processes. Even the Supreme Court does not insist on unanimous
decisions; a lack of complete consensus is a valid reflection
of the uncertainties present in judgment decisions.
The safety of the Nuclear Power industry relies on the
diligence of many professionals who worry about contingencies.
Redundancy of critical components and systems is a key factor
in ensuring public safety. The "Single Failure Criteria" that
Alison is exploring is fundamental to the concept of
Redundancy. She is not "...getting (unnecessarily) carried away
with possibilities," as Joe Carpello suggests. She is
exercising her professional responsibilities as a trusted
member of an oversight group. She is merely concerned that all
reasonably foreseeable contingencies be investigated.
When things go wrong, there is always a technical
explanation for the failure. But there is also inevitably a
procedural problem, involving human deficiencies (Carper 1989).
Often the procedural problem relates to a flawed decision
process and complacency regarding contingency plans. Mark
Reynold's suggestion that the concerns expressed by Alison be
referred back to the Mechanical Engineering group makes a lot
of sense. This act would not entail a great time delay. It will
impress the Mechanical Engineering group with the need to
investigate all contingencies when future problems arise. And,
even if the problem turns out to be less critical than it now
appears to Alison, the committee decision will truly be a
willing consensus. The more comprehensive review will be viewed
favorably by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the NRC
will likely place more credibility in future recommendations
from the committee.
One final concern deserves comment. The current report
implies that the cooling system is operating at or below the
limit of acceptable standards. The problem appears to be sand
blockage involving all four heat exchangers. If nothing is done
to remedy the situation, is it not likely to deteriorate
further? Yet, the dominant individuals in this group are
committed to getting on with business as usual. Robinson says,
"If we don't approve this, we may be facing a multi-million
dollar proposition."
Obviously, the time will come when a sizable expenditure
will be required, unless further compromises to public safety
are entertained. If Alison retains her commitment to
professionalism, and we hope she does, it will be even more
difficult to speak up next time. In the future, she may find it
necessary to take her concerns outside the company. At present,
however, the best option is to insist on voicing her
convictions within the organization (Martin and Schinzinger
1989). There may be others, like Mark Reynolds, who will follow
her example and improve the quality of interaction in this
committee.
Suggested Readings:
- Carper, Kenneth L., ed. 1989. Forensic Engineering,
Elsevier Science Publishers, New York, NY, pp. 14-31.
- Martin, Mike W. and R. Schinzinger 1989. Ethics in
Engineering (2nd edition), McGraw-Hill, Inc., New York, NY,
pp. 213-224.
- Maier, Norman R. F. 1980. "Assets and Liabilities in
Group Problem Solving: The Need for an Integrative Function,"
in Organization and People, by J. B. Ritchie and P. Thompson,
West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minnesota, pp.
170-180.
- Pletta, Dan H. 1987. " 'Uninvolved' Professionals and
Technical Disasters," Journal of Professional Issues in
Engineering, American Society of Civil Engineers, New York,
NY, Vol. 113, No. 1, January, pp. 23-31.
- Ritchie, J. B. and P. Thompson 1980. Organization and
People (2nd edition), West Publishing Company, St. Paul,
Minnesota, pp. 155-244.
- Rubin, Robert A. and Lisa A. Banick 1987. "The Hyatt
Regency Decision: One View," Journal of Performance of
Constructed Facilities, American Society of Civil Engineers,
New York, NY, Vol. 1, No. 3, August, pp. 161-167.
Cite this page:
"Kenneth L. Carper's Commentary on "Dissent about Nuclear Safety""
Online Ethics Center for Engineering
8/17/2006
National Academy of Engineering
Accessed: Tuesday, May 22, 2012
<www.onlineethics.org/Resources/Cases/Nuclear/NuclearCarper.aspx>