John B. Dilworth's Commentary
This is an interesting case because it brings out the almost
hypnotic (and, I shall argue, in this case myopically
misdirected) power of some moral concerns about lying.
Conventional wisdom assumes that there is something morally
problematic about Michael's decision to lie when confronted by
Al House.
But such a view fails to look at the full moral context of
cases such as the present one. This is a case where illegal
activity by a person (Al House) has been discovered. Knowing
that he has been discovered, the criminal perpetrator is
clearly in a malicious, destructive frame of mind, and is
determined to 'get' whoever 'ratted' on him. This is the moral
framework in terms of which Michael's decision to lie must be
judged. Hence the real moral issues here are those concerning
malicious questioning, rather than any concerning false
answering.
Any other view of the matter amounts to a form of the
familiar 'blame the victim' syndrome. (For example, in many
cases of wife-beating and rape the woman ends up getting blamed
as much, or even more so, than the male criminal.) Criminals
rip apart the fabric of civilized life, directly or indirectly
harming and twisting the actions of everyone involved.
It is all too easy to artificially abstract elements from
such a situation and draw up a kind of 'laundry list' of
morally problematic actions, which makes it look as if the
victims of the situation (including those who give evidence to
the proper authorities, or have to handle confrontations with
the criminal) bear some kind of moral guilt comparable to that
of the perpetrator(s). We must resist this temptation to
indulge in abstract theorizing, disconnected from the realities
of actual situations.
This is not to say that victimized people are free to do
anything whatsoever to cope with their traumatic situations.
But it is to say that their actions must be judged in the
specific context of the real and potential actions of the
criminal(s) involved.
In the present case, there are two aspects of Al's malicious
questioning which are relevant to deciding that it is perfectly
legitimate in this case for Michael to lie to Al. First, Al has
no right to know who reported him. As a general matter of
business policy, those reporting problems or abuses are
entitled to confidentiality, and they should especially be
protected from those who caused the abuses. Hence Michael is
under no obligation whatsoever to tell Al that it was he,
Michael, who reported Al.
It might be thought then that Michael should simply refuse
to tell Al whether he, Michael, had reported Al or not. But in
this special case, a refusal to supply information would itself
amount to a giving of the same information. This is for the
obvious reason that Al would instantly guess why Michael was
refusing to directly admit or deny that he was the informant,
namely because he really was the informant!
Thus in this special case, lying is justified as the only
effective method for withholding information, which information
one has every right to withhold.
So far we have made no use of the fact that Al's questioning
is done with malice in mind. This provides us with a second,
independent line of defence of lying as a defensive strategy
against malicious questioning. Even those who generally
criticize lying as wrong in principle are likely to admit some
cases when it is justified, such as for instance to protect
innocent life. In the case of a murderer demanding that you
tell him the whereabouts of his next victim, lying may even be
morally obligatory. But if we concede this, then should we not
also concede a group of related cases, in which other kinds of
malicious questioning are involved, including the present case?
If someone clearly intends to cause some harm to someone, if
told the truth, is it not at least morally permissible (even if
not obligatory) to lie to prevent the harm from occurring?
Here again it is tempting to treat the lying in abstraction
from the actual situation, such as in a claim that Michael's
lying is morally problematic because he has self-interested
reasons for doing it. But in the context of malicious
questioning, all that matters is whether someone is likely to
get hurt in some way unless one lies. Surely we have a moral
duty to prevent harm to innocent people, even if it is we
ourselves who are those innocent people. So in a case such as
this it is simply irrelevant whether the lying also serves
self-interest.
Finally, a few words on the amount and severity of the harm
that someone might be subjected to, who did not lie in the
given situation. It is easy to assume that only embarrassment
and 'bad feeling' would result from telling the truth. But the
harsh truth is that in the real world, anyone caught doing
something illegal or seriously compromising is liable to behave
in vicious, unpredictable ways towards their accusers.
Long-term revenge plots are a fact of life in our culture also.
Hence victims are fully justified in misleading such criminals
as necessary.
Cite this page:
"John B. Dilworth's Commentary"
Online Ethics Center for Engineering
3/27/2006
National Academy of Engineering
Accessed: Thursday, February 09, 2012
<www.onlineethics.org/Resources/Cases/CompanyResources/CompanyResourcesDilworth.aspx>