Michael Davis' Commentary on "US Parts"
Author(s):
Michael Davis
John Budinski, quality control engineer, has both an
employer, Clarke Engineering, and (through his employer) a
client, USAWAY. USAWAY has specified that products manufactured
for it be made in the United States. Clarke contracted to
provide USAWAY with a product "made to specs." Budinski has now
discovered a quality control problem. Two bolts were not made
in the USA. The problem may be only "cosmetic." The bolts are
as safe, reliable, and durable as their American counterparts.
Indeed, the problem may not even be cosmetic. The bolts are not
visible from the outside of the product and even someone
opening the product for repair would have to look carefully to
determine where a bolt was made. Still, the two bolts do not
meet specifications and part of the job of quality control is
to make sure products meet specifications. What should Budinski
do?
He should certainly not keep quiet. His job is to report
quality problems when he finds them. He has found a problem.
Deciding what to do about the problem will require consulting
others, not just "his superiors," but all those responsible for
producing the product or dealing with USAWAY. Cosmetic flaws
are a common quality problem. They are, I believe, seldom
resolved by trying to slip the product past a customer.
Instead, they are usually resolved by getting the customer to
waive a specification (perhaps in return for a small reduction
in price).
That may not be possible for USAWAY. They may have made
their reputation by selling only "All-American" products. If
so, the quality problem is not merely cosmetic. The product
might fail in a way that could seriously damage USAWAY's
reputation. It could fail to be "All-American." The only
alternative, then, is to replace the bolts now, whatever the
delay and whatever the expense to Clarke, or to try to get out
of the contract.
While I doubt any quality control engineer would seriously
consider passing the bolts on his own authority, the plant
manager might. Plant managers tend to focus too much on
"getting the product out the door" and too little on the
long-term effect of what they do. Timely delivery is usually
important when one company considers buying from another. So is
price. But just as important is quality, not necessarily
quality in any absolute sense, but quality in the sense of
meeting specifications. Most companies are willing to pay a bit
more and to put up with some delays if the only alternative is
receiving a product they may or may not be able to use.
Companies without a reputation for quality are usually pushed
to the margins of the market (as are companies that can't
deliver on time). Clarke Engineering's reputation for quality
is an important asset, one a plant manager can easily damage in
an attempt to get product out the door. A reputation for
quality, once lost, is hard to get back.
What then should Budinski do if his plant manager tells him
to "forget it and get the product out the door"? He might begin
by asking, "What happens to the contract if USAWAY finds out
what we're doing? What happens to you?" To these questions the
plant manager might respond, "They'll never find out." These
are "famous last words," a proverbial harbinger of disaster.
Budinski should unhesitatingly answer, "The Germans have a
saying, 'What two know, everyone knows.' Information like this
has a way of getting out. Already everyone in Quality Control
knows, plus some people on the assembly line. So, perhaps it
would be smarter to assume USAWAY will find out than that they
won't."
If the plant manager nonetheless persists, Budinski will
have to draw a line. The plant manager's conduct threatens the
welfare of both Budinski's employer, Clarke Engineering, and of
Clarke's client, USAWAY. Both are relying on Budinski to
control quality. His okay on a shipment invites others, both
employer and client, to believe that he has checked everything
in the approved ways and determined that everything at least
meets specifications. If he gives his okay when he knows the
product does not deserve it, he is in effect lying to those
relying on his judgment. So, at the very least, he must tell
the plant manager: "I can't say a shipment meets specifications
when it does not. Clarke doesn't pay me to lie about
quality."
Budinski probably can go this far without risking his job,
but he probably should go at least one step further. He should
try to get the plant manager to put his proposal to the Bright
Light Test. "If you want to take personal responsibility for
quality on this shipment," Budinski might continue, "you can do
it. You're the manager. I won't object--so long as you inform
the head office. They have a right to know you're risking
Clarke's reputation." Considering his proposal under the hard
light, senior management might shine on it, the plant manager
may have second thoughts. For example, he may suddenly realize
that, while he thought of his proposal as serving both his own
interests and Clarke's, senior management might not see things
that way. If anything went wrong, he would be--as the saying
goes--"up a creek without a paddle." He might then draw senior
management into the discussion.
What if senior management eventually approves sending USAWAY
the products without notifying them of the failure to meet
specifications? So long as Budinski does not have to vouch for
the products' quality, he need do nothing more. The public
safety, health, and welfare are not threatened. He has done
about all he reasonably could to protect Clarke's reputation.
He has given senior management a chance to do the right
thing.
No doubt, Budinski's disappointment will be great, great
enough perhaps to make him look for another job. Budinski
should, however, not allow disappointment to overshadow the
confidentiality he still owes his employer. He should not be
the teller of "war stories" from whom USAWAY first learns of
what Clarke did.
We must, I think, recognize that the temptation to "leak"
something to USAWAY will be great, even if Budinski stays with
Clarke. Clarke might benefit from such a leak. Letting that
shipment go out over the objections of quality control will set
a precedent. Clark will thereafter have more trouble
maintaining quality--getting product "out the door" will trump
quality--unless the USAWAY decision turns out badly. If USAWAY
learns what Clarke did and responds forcefully, Clarke will not
soon let timely delivery trump quality again. Clarke will have
learned a lesson, one likely to make it a better company, a
company its employees can respect.
Still the temptation to do good is here a temptation to do
wrong. The NSPE Code II.4 recognizes Clarke's right to make
business mistakes, even ones involving moral turpitude,
provided they do not threaten the public safety, health, or
welfare, or require an engineer's participation. (Compare NSPE
Code II.1.a and II.1.e.)