Michael Rabins' Commentary on "Question of Delegating Responsibilities"
Author(s):
Michael Rabins
It would appear that Dan Dorset has been somewhat imprudent
in putting his money down for the skiing condo vacation on such
a tight timetable with his work. By not leaving any slack in
his schedule, he is inviting Murphy's law to go into operation.
This fact puts him in a negative light when discussing his
situation with Ed Addison and others at Rancott.
First and foremost, Dan must "act in professional matters
for each employer or client as a faithful agent or trustee"
(NSPE Fundamental Canon #4). As a salaried employee of Rancott
he owes allegiance to their policies and procedures. He is
fully expected to loyally carry out Rancott's policy of sending
one of it's engineers to supervise all installations. This does
not mean accepting Boulding employee Jerry Taft's offer to
supervise the installation in his place. Even if Jerry Taft
were more qualified than Dan Dorset to supervise the
installation, that would not abrogate Dorset's responsibility
to sign off on correct installation as an employee of Rancott,
therefore assuming Rancott liability.
One other unlisted possibility that may be feasible in
version I of the case, is for Dan to go to the "nearby ski
resort" and start his skiing vacation as scheduled. Then, when
the two late units arrive two or more days later, he could
arrange for Jerry to call him and interrupt his vacation for
the "full day to install them". This would mean some additional
travel and cost to Dan, but he would still be meeting all of
his professional obligations. In this case, depending upon
company policy and how well he gets along with his supervisors,
it might be reasonable for him to request reimbursement for the
cost of the extra travel since the late delivery of the two
units was ostensibly Rancott's fault. Also, Rancott would
certainly have had to approve Dan's vacation in advance, so his
supervisors had to have known about Dan's vacation plans.
However, it is difficult to make a case for any reason for Dan
Dorset to call Rancott's home office to ask permission to let
Jerry take care of the two units. Similarly, it is difficult to
justify Dan's just leaving for his vacation while accepting
Jerry's offer to supervise the installation.
In either one of these latter scenarios, Dan and Jerry would
obviously have had to sign off on the final installation
documentation (version IV) in clear violation of several
aspects of the NSPE code of ethics. First there is the
Fundamental Canon about issuing public statements in a truthful
manner (I-3). Then there is the Rule of Practice regarding not
signing any plan or document not prepared under their direction
and control (II-2-b). Next there is the Professional Obligation
to not sign any specifications that are not in conformity with
accepted engineering standards (III-2-b). The standard here is
the announced Rancott policy of having their salaried employee
supervise all installations. Finally there is the Professional
Obligation to avoid misrepresentations which are misleading or
intended to create an unjustified expectation(III-3-a). Here
the unjustified expectation by Boulding would be that the
installation had been overseen by a Rancott employee (not Jerry
Taft, their employee), and that Rancott was accordingly
assuming liability.
Version II of the case raises some additional flags. First,
it is not clear that Ed Addison's cocktail conversation with
Dan was appropriate. It misses all of the points raised in the
previous paragraphs about the professional ethics of the
situation or the expected loyalty of Dan (and Ed) to Rancott.
The question is not whether Dan should have left early if he
had known Ed's position when he was at Boulding. The question
is really whether Ed's position was acceptable and what should
Dan have told him-- in a nice way over a second beer.
Incidentally, Ed's final response to Dan's question in version
II about the risk involved raises still other questions. How
could the risk be estimated of installing the units without
Dan's supervision? How safe would be safe enough? There is some
excellent literature on risk analysis and risk management which
may be relevant reading for Rancott management in reviewing
their policy. Some of this literature differentiates between
voluntary risks (like skiing) and involuntary risks (like using
equipment not properly installed by others).
The new idea introduced in version III of the case is that
Rancott is not required by law or contract to supervise
installations. This fact really does not change previous
arguments presented above. The Rancott policy of requiring
installation supervision by a Rancott employee supersedes
whatever contractual arrangements have been negotiated between
Rancott and Boulding. Further, legality does not equal
morality. There have been many laws in the past that were
clearly immoral (supporting slavery or genocide for example)
and there has been an absence of many needed laws which would
have pointed to moral behavior. The resulting laws following
Watergate are a case in point.
Version V introduces a new consideration, namely that
instead of a skiing vacation, a following important assignment
of a second installation is a scheduling conflict. Regardless
of Dan's conversation with Ed (in version III) it is incumbent
on Dan to either get Rancott to send a substitute for him to
Boulding or to rearrange his follow-on schedule. For all of the
reasons given above, Dan should not allow himself or the
company to be put in a vulnerable position just to maintain a
schedule. Whether in this version or the following one (VI)
where he went skiing and nothing ever goes wrong, it is still
incumbent upon Dan and his company to do the right and
professionally acceptable thing.