Kenneth L. Carper's Commentary on "Question of Delegating Responsibilities"
Author(s):
Kenneth L. Carper
Dan Dorset has been provided with an excellent opportunity
to demonstrate the extent of his personal commitment to
professionalism. He can act in his own self-interest, or at
some personal cost, he can choose to act in the interest of
public safety. The easier, less-costly alternative violates
company policy and may increase the risk of accidents. The
right thing to do is clear.
Unfortunately, an attractive compromise has been presented.
Jerry Taft's offer would relieve Dan of any personal cost and
would compromise professional principles only slightly.
Dan's employer has funded his travel to supervise
installation of equipment. The location of the project is near
a ski resort. Dan's vacation plans at the resort were
predicated on the assumption that there would be no delays in
the project. He didn't provide for a single day of
contingencies when making these plans.
Construction engineering projects always involve scheduling
uncertainties. Dan surely recognizes that planning with no
contingencies was his responsibility. His concern for public
safety, along with acknowledgment of deficient planning on his
part, should encourage him to eliminate any options that imply
increased risk to the client or the public, even if these risks
are of very low probability.
Of the options listed at the end of Part I, only the first
is directly driven by the moral principles of professionalism:
Decline Jerry Taft's offer and stay until the job is complete.
The second option also has some merit. A call to the home
office may suggest some additional alternatives. For example,
Dan's supervisor, Ed Addison may offer some additional vacation
days or other compensation, or he may be able to suggest ways
to circumvent the immediate installation of safety-critical
components of the equipment so that other construction
scheduling is not unnecessarily delayed.
This option, not listed at the end of Part I, deserves some
consideration. Perhaps the installation of the final two units
could simply be delayed altogether until after Dan's vacation.
Not enough information is given to assess the possibility of
this option. It may be that the project schedule would be
severely impacted by such a delay, but creative people might be
able to find an acceptable compromise. Ed Addison should feel
some obligation to assist Dan in meeting both his professional
and personal commitments, insofar as possible.
In Part II, Ed Addison exhibits some very disturbing
attitudes for an engineer in a management position. Ed is
clearly motivated by the desire to avoid personal
responsibility for management decisions. He would rather not
know when company policies or professional responsibilities are
being circumvented. This attitude is not likely to inspire
confidence with his subordinates, or to encourage them to
accept responsibility.
Complacency and a cavalier attitude regarding professional
responsibility is contagious within organizations, particularly
when management sets this tone. Rubin and Banick, in their
outstanding review of the Kansas City Hyatt pedestrian walkway
collapse, refer to the complacent attitude of the design
engineer. In this case, 114 people were killed and another 200
seriously injured, partly due to this complacency. Rubin and
Banick ask:
How can their conduct be explained? An understanding of
their conduct is perhaps the most important lesson that can be
drawn from the Hyatt collapse because it represents, more than
anything else, a human failure to which all professionals are
subject. Some succumb, some do not; most are just plain lucky
in that they do not get caught. Our errors are picked up by
others, or although our errors go undetected, no tragedy
ensues. Complacency is a human failure. It creeps into a
professional's approach to practice as the newness, excitement,
and other early rewards of the profession fade. The
professional becomes indifferent and stops worrying and
agonizing. He takes shortcuts and gets away with it, and then
takes more shortcuts. It becomes a way of life. This is human.
The shock of an occasional failure brings him to his senses and
forces him to reevaluate his conduct. (Rubin & Banick
1987)
Ed Addison's attitudes are particularly disturbing since
Rancott's equipment has experienced some recent failures. The
possibility of failure should be more than an abstract concept
to Ed, and he has a responsibility to convey the seriousness of
inspection to his young subordinate, Dan Dorsett.
Apparently, it is all right for Ed's subordinates to take
risks, but he won't. His cautious approach to risk-taking
involves concern for his "own neck," rather than concern for
public safety, should something "go wrong." This self-interest
based concern is also evident in his comments about skiing,
although there is no ethical conflict here. The risks one takes
while skiing are directly related to one's own well-being. The
risks taken by professionals involving the welfare of others
fall into an entirely different moral category.
Complacency is a dangerous attitude for an engineer. But
engineers in the corporate setting, particularly in management
positions, can become insulated from the public they serve.
Professional responsibility may become an abstract concept,
unrelated to day-to-day decisions.
The dialogue presented in Part II certainly does not suggest
a reevaluation of the moral rightness of Dan's decision. Ed is
not a worthy role model for professional responsibility. The
safety of society depends to a great extent on a professional
engineering community that takes its responsibilities much more
seriously than Ed Addison does. The profession has a long
tradition of engineers who have spent sleepless nights
contemplating the risks associated with their judgments
(Petroski 1985). Were this not so, there would be far more
failures of engineered facilities and products.
Ed Addison says, "...the bottom line is satisfied customers
and keeping Rancott, Inc. out of trouble..." This statement is
absolutely untrue. The primary guiding principle for engineers
is to "use their knowledge and skill for the advancement of
human welfare." (Evans 1988). The Code of Ethics further
instructs engineers to "hold paramount the safety, health, and
welfare of the public in the performance of their professional
duties." Thus, the engineer's ethical responsibilities extend
far beyond the employer and the client. Engineers are more than
employees of a corporation. They are licensed professionals,
trusted by society to maintain this focus on the public welfare
(Rubin and Banick 1987).
Perhaps it should be noted here that other professions may
operate under entirely different ethical guidelines. For
example, attorneys are bound by their Code of Ethics to always
act in their client's interest (Carper 1990). This concept
could have disastrous implications for public safety, should it
be adopted by the engineering profession.
Ed Addison would like to avoid failure. However, he
interprets this task as his responsibility to "keep Rancott,
Inc. out of trouble," rather than a responsibility to protect
the public welfare. The danger in this attitude toward failure
is that it confuses liability with professional responsibility.
The engineer who is motivated merely by the desire to avoid
liability may simply address the problem by writing contracts
that transfer responsibilities to others, and by purchasing
more insurance to insulate the firm from the economic impact of
failure. This approach alone is not in the interest of public
safety, but it is all too common in the current litigious
society. Traditionally, engineers have accepted the
responsibilities of their profession, and have been diligently
motivated by concerns for the public who will suffer when
things go wrong.
In Part IV, the violation of company policy and compromised
professional standards leads to a further deterioration of
principles, as small compromises often do. The next step
involves falsification of records. This is a definite
complication, one that raises legal implications in addition to
new ethical issues.
Part V asks us to consider the dilemma from a new
perspective. Dan's situation is now the result of a new job
assignment. In this case, he should insist on official orders
from Ed Addison authorizing him to leave the first assignment
prior to completion. This transfers responsibility to Ed; it
will be good for him.
While asking for official orders, it might be in order for
Dan to further discuss with Ed the ethical dimensions of his
statements. He might include reference to the lessons Dan is
learning from Ed's example. Perhaps Ed has become so insulated
in his management position that he is no longer cognizant of
his professional responsibilities that extend beyond
enforcement of company policies. Perhaps he is unaware of his
important influence on the professional development of his
colleagues.
Part VI introduces the question of probability of outcome.
The varying probabilities of various outcomes certainly ought
to be a factor in making professional judgments among
alternatives. It should always be recognized that these
probabilities are estimates, and even if they prove to be
accurate statistically, an outcome having a low predicted
probability is still a possibility.
For this reason, the actual outcome should not necessarily
be given greater weight than other alternative outcomes when
reviewing the rightness or wrongness of a prior decision. While
the consequences may be undesirable, the decision may have been
morally correct, given the information available at the time
the decision was made. Similarly, a positive outcome should not
be used to justify a decision that was morally flawed.
Risk analysis is an important component of engineering
(Martin and Schinzinger 1989). One contemporary engineer who
specializes in risk analysis defines this activity as
"assessing the probability of regret." Consideration of risk is
something one should lose sleep over; it is not something to be
taken lightly, as Dan is tempted to do, for personal
convenience.
Suggested Readings:
- Carper, Kenneth L. 1990. "Ethical Considerations for the
Forensic Engineer Serving as an Expert Witness,"
Business and Professional Ethics Journal,
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY, Vol. 9, Nos. 1
and 2, Spring-Summer, pp. 21-34.
- Evans, R. J. 1988. "Commentary on the Code of Ethics,"
Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering,
American Society of Civil Engineers, New York, NY, Vol. 114,
No. 2, April, pp. 148-156.
- Martin, Mike W. and R. Schinzinger 1989. Ethics in
Engineering (2nd edition), McGraw-Hill, Inc., New
York, NY, pp. 118-124.
- Petroski, Henry 1985. To Engineer is Human,
St. Martin's Press, New York, NY, pp. 214-215.
- Rubin, Robert A. and Lisa A. Banick 1987. "The Hyatt
Regency Decision: One View," Journal of Performance of
Constructed Facilities, American Society of Civil
Engineers, New York, NY, Vol. 1, No. 3, August, pp.
161-167.